

# Security of AI Agents

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# On the Emergence of LLM-based AI Agents I

*LLM-based AI agents* are robots in cyberspace, taking user instructions in natural language (NL), and executing tasks on behalf of their users. The LLM, as the brain of the agent, can

- understand and reason about the user's query ( $Q$ ),
- perceive the environment and available tools by NL descriptions,
- generate tool-use actions ( $A$ ) to be executed by the agent.

# On the Emergence of LLM-based AI Agents II




Figure 1: Overview of LLM-based AI agent. AI agents may interact with the environment by API calls to tools, or use device control to mimic human users.

# Common Design Pattern of AI Agents

The agent often takes multiple steps to complete a task, which can be abstracted as a production sequence [1]:

$$\text{Agent} : Q \xrightarrow{LLM} Q A \quad (1)$$




Figure 2: Common stateful design patterns of AI agents.

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# Vulnerabilities of AI Agent Designs

**Sessions.** Recall Equation 1, the state of the LLM-based agent is encoded in the context query  $Q$ , explicitly in natural language.

## **Insufficient Access Control.**

- There lacks a proper access control mechanism in the agent.
- GUI agents control the computer using human-like actions.
- API agents send the same requests as regular software.
- Model Context Protocol <sup>1</sup> enables integration between agents and data sources and tools but *not an access control mechanism* that differentiates agents from human users.

**The Vulnerability Inherited from the LLM.** Fine-tuning with usage data to improve agent workflow  $\times$  adversarial users  $\implies$  model pollution and privacy leak.

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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol>

# Vulnerabilities of Running Agent Programs I




Figure 3: An illustration of vulnerabilities of zero-shot action agents.

“World”: the host OS of the agent and external API resources.

Malicious actions can be generated from adversarial prompts, model pollution, or model hallucination *without* malicious party.

# Vulnerabilities of Running Agent Programs II




Figure 4: Each step of the agent's planning process is a potential attack vector. Even if the users are interacting with the agent program in a non-harmful way, they might still cause security issues unintentionally.

# Vulnerabilities of Running Agent Programs III

When agents are deployed on machines (PC, mobile, etc.), with access to local files and applications, and tools to call applications and external APIs,

- **Confidentiality:** agents gain read access to files and data on the local machine, some may contain adversarial prompts, while others may be sensitive.
- **Integrity:** agents gain write access to files and applications, allowing attack vectors for tool misuse and data corruption.
- **Availability:** specially designed prompts may cause the agent to hang in the reasoning/planning process, or even consume all resources on the local machine with generated actions.

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# System Security for Safe Agent Design: Sessions




Figure 5: Session management for stateful LLM-based AI agent. We use numbers with gray boxes to denote the session ID.

- For one-agent-multiple-users design, we can use a key-value database (KVDB) to manage sessions for different users.
- However, recall equation 1, the state of the agent for *each user* is still encoded in the context query  $Q$ .

# System Security for Safe Agent Design: Sandbox

Table 1: Unconstrained agents will execute dangerous actions.

	#Task	#Gen	#Exec	Attacked
Confidentiality	25	25	24	96.0%
Integrity	35	35	30	85.7%
Availability	35	30	22	62.9%
Total	95	90	76	80.0%




Figure 6: AI agent design with sandbox for actions isolation.

# Encryption for Agent Data Access




Figure 7: AI agents with encryption.

Encryption	Model	SuccCiph	SuccPlain
FPETS	gpt-3.5-t	49.0%	47.0%
FPETS	gpt-4-t	55.0%	57.0%
FHE	gpt-3.5-t	85.0%	99.0%
FHE	gpt-4-t	89.0%	94.0%


Table 2: Tool-use performance of AI agents.

FPETS: Format-Preserving Encryption for Text Slicing.

FHE: Fully Homomorphic Encryption.

Encryption defense does not substantially compromise the usability of AI agents' tool-use.

# User-Specific Agent Fine-tuning



$\theta_{P_i}$  denotes the added trainable parameters only for the user's chat history.

AI agents can be improved by updating only  $\theta_P$ , without compromising the foundational LLM or leaking private information.

Figure 8: Session-aware AI agents with prompt tuning.

Thanks For Your Attention!  
Any questions?

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T. Sumers, S. Yao, K. Narasimhan, and T. Griffiths, “Cognitive architectures for language agents,” *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2024.